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This Article considers the civic constitutionalist nature of the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. Civic constitutionalism is a mode of reading 
constitutional texts that considers power in political, as opposed to legal, 
terms. Thus, the civic constitution gives citizens, not judges, the primary duty 
for ensuring a constitutionally compliant society. This Article also presents 
the underlying reasons, effects, and costs of the obscurity of the 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I consider the significance of one of the preambular 
provisions of the Constitution for our understanding of civic 
constitutionalism. Civic constitutionalism, I argued in Peopling the 
Constitution, is a particular way of comprehending what kind of thing the 
Constitution is, what sort of authority it commands, and what kind of 
community it calls into being.1 It conceives of constitutional authority in 
political rather than legal terms and assigns a very large measure of 
responsibility for achieving a constitutional way of life to citizens. Civic 
constitutionalism thus stands in contrast to most scholarly accounts of 
constitutional maintenance, which instead invest judges, primarily, and other 
constitutional offices, secondarily, with responsibility for holding us to our 
constitutional commitments. The Constitution’s preambular provisions are 
especially important to understanding the Constitution’s civic character. 
Preambles are the “key,” in the words of Joseph Story, 2  to reading the 
Constitution and also to locating the Constitution’s identity in politics rather 
than in law, or in what I have called the “Civic Constitution.” 
There are four preambles in the Constitution, including, obviously, 
the Great Preamble (We the People). But there are three other preambular 
provisions in the document. One is in Article I, Section 8, where Congress is 
given the power “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 3  Most readings assume this 
                                                 
1 See John E. Finn, The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 41–69 
(Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001) [hereinafter Preliminaries] (coining the 
term “Civic Constitution”); JOHN E. FINN, PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION 6–8, 129–31, 229 
n.43 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Sanford Levinson eds., 2014) [hereinafter PEOPLING] (explaining 
that civic constitutionalism bears a resemblance to popular constitutionalism, but is different 
in important ways); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see generally PEOPLING, supra; 
ELIZABETH BEAUMONT, THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND STRUGGLES IN THE 
PATH TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2014); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000). 
2  BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL 
FUNCTIONALITY 50 (2009) (quoting Joseph Story: “It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary 
course of the administration of justice, that the preamble . . . is a key to open the mind of the 
makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be 
accomplished by the provisions of the [text]”) (citation omitted). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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clause simply establishes the power of Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights. Garry Wills, however, argues that unlike the rest of Section 8, 
which presents the powers of Congress “in the infinitive: to regulate, 
commerce, to coin money, to establish a post office, to declare war,”4 the 
founders decided in this instance to include a goal, or “mini-preamble,”5 
along with the explicit power. As a result, this power is not presented as an 
infinitive power, but rather as a means of achieving the goal of promoting 
science and the useful arts. 
Wills’s reading of this preamble, especially insofar as it ascribes to it 
a purpose to attain a more perfect constitutional order, is welfarist in 
character6—it conceives of an ongoing constitutional project committed to 
particular ends. This reading implies that its meaning is not purely 
exhortatory, but is instead substantive, and that it should influence how we 
make sense of and apply it (as a means to the realization of constitutionally 
desirable ends). More generally, it hints at how we should read all of the 
Constitution’s preambles by suggesting that their significance is not confined 
to their infrequent use as interpretive devices in constitutional litigation but 
is instead a function of their importance to the larger project of constitutional 
maintenance. 
Another preamble opens the Second Amendment: “A well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”7 The significance of this 
preamble has been a matter of intense scholarly and judicial exegesis for at 
least the last two decades.8 Much of this literature, especially in recent years, 
has concentrated on the question of whether the Second Amendment 
establishes an individual, judicially enforceable right to bear arms and 
equally on the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning that 
question. But some of this literature has also considered whether the prefatory 
                                                 
4 Deconstructing the Constitution in Support of the Arts, PA. GAZETTE, May 12, 1998, 
http://www.upenn.edu/gazette/0598/0598gaz5.html. 
5 Id. 
6 See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
8  See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 
(1989); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). As I indicate below, however, my argument that the Preamble 
to the Bill of Rights tells us to embrace a civic reading of the Bill of Rights may have 
important implications for how we should read the preambular language in the Second 
Amendment. See infra p. 38 and notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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clause hints at a civic interpretation of the Amendment’s operative clause. 
For example, some scholars, such as David C. Williams and Suzette 
Hemberger, have explored whether and to what extent this preamble is 
evidence of the civic meaning of the Second Amendment.9 
My focus in this Article, in contrast, is on a different, largely forgotten 
preamble in the Constitution—the long neglected Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights, which in full provides: 
 
Congress of the United States 
begun and held at the City of New-York, on 
Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and 
eighty nine. 
 
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of 
their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent 
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and 
restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of 
public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent 
ends of its institution. 
 
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both 
Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the 
Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States, all, or any of which Articles, when ratified by 
three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and 
purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz. 
 
ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the 
                                                 
9 See David C. Williams, Civic Constitutionalism, the Second Amendment, and the Right 
of Revolution, 79 IND. L.J. 379 (2004) [hereinafter Civic Constitutionalism]; see also Suzette 
Hemberger, What Did They Think They Were Doing When They Wrote the U.S. Constitution, 
and Why Should We Care?, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION 
MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE, supra note 1; Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, 
Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing 
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661 (1989); see generally David C. Williams, Civic 
Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
551 (1991) [hereinafter Civic Republicanism] (discussing the Second Amendment and civic 
meaning).  
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Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the 
original Constitution.10 
 
At least as measured by academic treatments (which are very few) or 
by popular knowledge (which is nonexistent), the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights is obscure if not forgotten.11 Indeed, most copies of the Constitution 
                                                 
10 Robert A. Destro, Federalism, Human Rights, and the Realpolitik of Footnote Four, 
12 WIDENER L.J. 373, 381 n.22 (2003). This is not the original text. In the earliest versions, 
James Madison proposed a revision to the opening preamble so that it would read: “That the 
people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their 
government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.” 
James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 441 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). This new text, in Madison’s 
plan, would immediately precede the well-known phrase “We the People.” Id. Similarly, 
most of the individual amendments were first proposed as amendments to Article I, § 9, i.e., 
as limits on congressional power: “The decision to propose the amendments as separate 
articles, while hotly controverted, was based on stylistic rather than substantive 
considerations.” DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789-1801, 856 (1996). In presenting his proposal to Congress, Madison observed 
that:  
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration—That all 
power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people. 
That Government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of 
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the 
right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety.  
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or 
inadequate to the purposes of its institution. 
James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments, in JAMES 
MADISON: WRITINGS 441 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). Roger Sherman of Connecticut 
replied, “The truth is better asserted than it can be by any words what so ever. The words 
‘We the People’ in the original Constitution are as copious and expressive as possible.” Five 
Items Congress Deleted from Madison’s Original Bill of Rights, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Dec. 
13, 2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/12/five-items-congress-deleted-from-
madisons-original-bill-of-rights/. As David Currie observes, “The principal objection voiced 
to amending the Preamble to affirm popular sovereignty was that the same idea was already 
expressed in the introductory phrase ‘We, the people.’” David P. Currie, The Constitution in 
Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 852 
n.450 (1994). The final language of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights was approved by the 
Senate on September 8, 1789. Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 1800: 
The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 175–76 nn.88–
89 (2006). 
11 Ironically, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is well known and oft quoted by citizens 
active in Second Amendment and guns-rights groups. See Civic Constitutionalism, supra 
note 9. 
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do not reproduce it.12 One of the things I consider here is the reasons for its 
obscurity. A second consideration concerns the effects of that obscurity. As 
it turns out, these are very related questions—if indeed not the same inquiry 
put two ways.  
The reasons for the obscurity of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights lie 
in a choice we have made about how to read the Constitution and in turn 
about how to read the Bill of Rights. As I have argued elsewhere, there are 
two principal ways to read the Constitution—two ways of understanding the 
Constitution’s claim to authority.13 Both of these are two very different ways 
of comprehending what kind of community the Constitution envisions and 
constitutes. One conception, the Juridic Constitution, locates the Constitution 
in law. The other, the Civic Constitution, grounds the Constitution in 
politics.14 
The Juridic Constitution (and likewise most scholarly accounts of 
constitutional maintenance) invests judges with primary, if not exclusive, 
responsibility for maintaining our constitutional commitments. I call it the 
Juridic Constitution, not the legal constitution, because the word juridic 
highlights issues of ownership and exclusivity.15 Because it is law, the Juridic 
Constitution is the property of judges and lawyers, who have assumed 
primary institutional responsibility for maintaining the Constitution. 
Locating the Juridic Constitution’s authority in law influences how we read 
and understand the text: indeed, lawyers have reconstituted the text in their 
own image. “Our conception of the Constitution has been shaped by 
[lawyer’s] instincts and intellectual habits.”16 
                                                 
12 An interesting question arises as to whether the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is 
actually a part of the Constitution or not. The Preamble was sent to the states with the 
proposed amendments, but whether the states, in ratifying those amendments, ratified the 
Preamble to them is a more complicated question and not only because not all of the original 
amendments were ratified. In any event, most copies of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights do not include the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE 
INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008) (reproducing the Preamble to the Bill of Rights in full, a 
notable exception). 
13 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 1–32. 
14 Preliminaries, supra note 1, at 41–69. 
15 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938); ROBERT F. NAGEL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1989). 
16 Preliminaries, supra note 1, at 41–69. 
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The Civic Constitution, in contrast, emphasizes the Constitution’s 
identity as a political text. Civic constitutionalism embraces a very different 
understanding about what the constitutional enterprise means, about what it 
entails, and about how to maintain it over time than does the more commonly 
understood Juridic Constitution. The Civic Constitution does not reduce to or 
find its primary expression through law. Instead, its identity is found in 
politics. The Civic Constitution anticipates a community in which 
constitutional questions are, first, matters of publicly debatable civic 
aspirations to practice a constitutional way of life. Its purposes are to establish 
a community—a civic culture—that prizes questions about the fundamental 
principles and purposes of shared social life. These principles include, among 
others, the meaning of liberty, equality, and justice. Under the Civic 
Constitution, discussion about the “basic organizing” principles of 
constitutional life are therefore as much—and likely more—questions about 
politics as they are about legal reasoning. It requires that we consider that the 
juridic understanding of the Constitution is insufficient to the achievement of 
a constitutional way of life.17 
Implicit in Juridic and Civic constitutionalism are two very different 
conceptions of constitutional maintenance and to whom it should be 
entrusted. The juridic conception embodies a particular and narrow 
conception of what the project of constitutional maintenance comprehends 
(preserving the law) and to whom it is assigned (judges). The civic 
conception of constitutional maintenance, in contrast, relies heavily on a 
robust understanding of civic duty and citizenship as well as an ambitious 
and deeply democratic project of civic education in the principles and 
commitments central to a constitutional way of life. The Civic Constitution 
assigns a broader, more expansive purpose to the text than simply subjecting 
the state to higher law, and consequently it asks more of citizens in realizing 
that purpose. 
We do not always appreciate that these different conceptions of 
constitutional authority and identity influence not only how we read the 
Constitution but also what parts of the Constitution we read and, indeed, 
whether we read them at all. Put more directly, our common understanding 
of the Constitution as essentially a creation and instrument of law, composed 
of powers, rights, and liberties enforced primarily by judges, has caused us 
                                                 
17 The material in this paragraph is adapted from PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 1–32. 
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not only to misapprehend the significance of the Great Preamble but also to 
ignore the other preambles in the Constitution. The purposes and significance 
we assign to these preambles depend in large measure on what kind of thing 
we think the Constitution is. 
I. PREAMBULAR PROVISIONS AS CLAIMS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
 My claim that preambles are important because they contribute to our 
understanding of the Constitution—of what kind of thing it is and what it tells 
us about our constitutional selves—should seem unexceptional. As Mark 
Tushnet has noted, “[P]reambles to constitutions are exceptionally 
informative in conveying the underlying meaning of the collective enterprise 
that is the constitution.”18 
As is well known, however, the Great Preamble’s part in establishing 
constitutional meaning, especially for judges, is more symbolic than 
substantive, more rhetorical than real. If judges have not reduced it to “a 
steaming chunk of rhetoric,” 19  the Great Preamble nonetheless is of no 
consequence in contemporary constitutional litigation. Joseph Story’s 
assessment, alluded to above, captures the general rule: a preamble 
“expounds the nature and extent” of the powers “actually conferred by the 
constitution” but it does not “create them.”20 On this reading, a preamble 
creates no substantive powers and no substantive liberties, but it may be used 
to discern the purposes and objects of the Constitution broadly.21 This is the 
                                                 
18 GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 12 (2010). 
19 WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING 
A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 209 (2007).  
20 David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public 
Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2009). 
21 Or, as Eugene Volokh concludes:  
What then does the justification clause mean? It might have a political and 
educational goal--stressing to the public and government officials the 
connection between an armed citizenry and freedom, just as other 
provisions may aim to persuade people about the desirability of “a more 
perfect Union” or the virtue of local trials or the importance of the liberty 
of the press. But we still properly expect the clause, like all constitutional 
provisions, to have some legal meaning. To borrow from United States v. 
Miller, the only 20th-century Supreme Court case that deals with the 
Second Amendment at any length, it seems reasonable to say: “With 
obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the 
effectiveness of [the Militia] the declaration and guarantee of the Second 
Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end 
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position adopted by Chester Antieau, who concludes in his well-known book, 
Constitutional Construction, that “[t]he Preamble . . . illuminates the objects 
of the Framers and, thus, can be a guide to construction, but it is not 
considered to confer powers or rights.” 22  Judicial treatments of the 
Constitution’s other preambles confirms their general irrelevance in 
constitutional interpretation.23 
Embedded in these sorts of treatments are two claims about the 
meaning of preambles in constitutional design and maintenance. The first is 
that a preamble has little significance when judges take up the business of 
constitutional interpretation. The paradigmatic example of this position is 
Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,24 where 
he observed: 
 
Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for 
which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it 
has never been regarded as the source of any substantive 
power conferred on the Government of the United States or 
on any of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those 
expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and such as 
may be implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, 
one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure 
the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction 
and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to 
that end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble, 
                                                 
in view.” I believe the justification clause may aid construction of the 
operative clause but may not trump the meaning of the operative clause: 
To the extent the operative clause is ambiguous, the justification clause 
may inform our interpretation of it, but the justification clause can’t take 
away what the operative clause provides. And because we know that 
operative clauses may be at times broader and at times narrower than 
justification clauses, we should accept that the two clauses will sometimes 
point in different directions. 
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 807 (1998). 
22 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 31 (1982). 
23  See generally Milton Handler et al., A Reconsideration of the Relevance and 
Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117 
(1990); but see District of Columbia v. Heller, 550 U.S. 570 (2008). 
24 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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it be found in some express delegation of power or in some 
power to be properly implied therefrom.25 
 
The second assumption, a fair but not strictly a necessary consequence of the 
first one, is that any significance the Great Preamble does have is merely 
exhortatory, subordinate, and secondary to the Constitution’s meaning and 
enforcement: the project of constitutional maintenance. 
Like the Great Preamble, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights declares 
an overarching purpose to achieve the “beneficent ends” of the constitutional 
enterprise, which is equally insignificant to the Juridic Constitution.26 Read 
through a juridic lens, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights has little significance 
because it creates no substantive rights and has little to say about how any of 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights should be approached as rights claims.27 
A juridic reading of the constitutional text thus has no use for the Preamble 
to the Bill of Rights because it offers little of interpretive significance for how 
judges make sense of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights in the 
process of constitutional litigation over their meaning and enforcement. Put 
another way, when read juridically the provisions of the Bill of Rights require 
no reference to the Preamble to the Bill of Rights because the Preamble to the 
Bill of Rights has no significant bearing on what the individual provisions of 
the Bill of Rights mean or how judges should enforce them.28 Its peripherality 
                                                 
25 Id. at 13.  
26 Volokh, supra note 21, at 807. Eugene Volokh has argued that many preambular 
provisions (although his focus is on the preambular language of the Second Amendment, a 
key part of Volokh’s claim is that justification clauses were a commonplace of state 
constitutional design) include both justification and operative clauses—the former, he 
suggests, often create “political and educational goal[s].” Id. Such provisions “may aim to 
persuade people about the desirability of ‘a more perfect Union’ . . . .” Id. These ends, 
standing alone, create no rights and impose no substantive limitations on the exercise of state 
power. In Volokh’s view, however, “we still properly expect the clause, like all constitutional 
provisions, to have some legal meaning.” Id. My point, in contrast, is that its legal meaning 
does not exhaust or preclude other meanings, or even necessarily trump them. 
27 This is also true, one might note, of a civic reading of the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights. This misses the point, however. The purpose of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, 
read civically, is not to provide specific instructions to judges or very particular guidance 
about the meaning of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights as enforceable rights 
claims. On the other hand, it is not completely irrelevant to an inquiry into what individual 
provisions might mean in litigation, as I suggest below concerning both the First and Second 
Amendments. See infra pp. 36–40 and notes 124–37 and accompanying text. 
28 The Ninth and Tenth Amendments might be the exceptions to the general rule that the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights is irrelevant to how judges interpret the individual provisions 
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to a juridic reading of the Bill of Rights is one of the primary explanations 
for the obscurity of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. 
  A juridic reading of the Bill of Rights assumes the correct, proper, 
and best way to read it is one that emphasizes its character as a limitation on 
powers through the device of rights that can be secured against the state 
through litigation, or as “a legalistic set of protected rights.”29 Hence, the 
primary significance of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights is that 
they may be enforced against the state in courts; therefore, they take on 
meaning through the practice of constitutional litigation. This point is of 
special significance: my claim is not only that the individual provisions of the 
Bill of Rights take on meaning through constitutional litigation, but rather, 
more specifically, that these provisions acquire a particular sort of legal 
meaning and simultaneously fail to take on other sorts of meanings, meanings 
that have a civic purpose and civic function. 
A juridic reading of the Bill of Rights therefore emphasizes its 
character as judicially enforceable limitations on states rather than as civic 
educative statements about the body politic. This has two consequences: first, 
it means that the meaning of specific provisions in the Bill of Rights is 
determined by questions that speak to the problems of constitutional 
interpretation by judges and not, more expansively, as civic commitments 
and responsibilities. (For a good example, see my discussion in Peopling the 
Constitution about civic versus legal readings of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.) Second, and related, it means that it is judges who read the Bill 
of Rights and not citizens who hold little, if any, responsibility for their 
realization or enforcement. A juridic reading of the Bill of Rights embodies 
a particular and unique incentive structure: it simultaneously establishes 
incentives for judges to read the text and disincentives for citizens to do so. 
These disincentives trace from a kind of aphanisis, or what Tushnet calls the 
“overhang effect” of judicial supremacy,30 in which the tendency of judges 
                                                 
of the Bill of Rights. I’ll say more about this below, but for now I would note that it is much 
more difficult to read either provision as establishing an individual rights claim.  
29 Donald S. Lutz, Political Participation in Eighteenth-Century America, in TOWARD 
A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 31 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. 
Gottlieb eds., 1991). As Amar observes, “We think the Bill of Rights is about individual 
rights, not majority rights.” Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on “The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution,” 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 100 (1992) [hereinafter Comments]. 
30 Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 504 (2009). See also PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 133–34 (discussing 
interpretive aphanisis). 
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to assume responsibility for the constitutional text dissuades other 
constitutional actors from doing so. But the cause of civic neglect is larger 
and more comprehensive than a system of judicial review that installs a 
particular kind of judicial supremacy. It is instead a direct consequence of the 
Juridic Constitution itself, which significantly undermines the civic 
components of the constitutional enterprise by further distancing citizens 
from the constitutional project. In doing so, the Juridic Constitution trivializes 
the Bill of Rights as an instrument of civic education by advancing an 
understanding of the Constitution that emphasizes its legal character at the 
expense of its civic ambitions.31 
This conventional reading of the Bill of Rights is “discontinuous” 
with an understanding of the Bill of Rights as fundamentally instructional. 
But Amar writes that: 
 
[I]f we look carefully at the Bill of Rights, we will see it as 
much less discontinuous with the original Constitution than 
most of us have been led to believe. Most of us tend to 
embrace the conventional reading that the Bill of Rights is 
fundamentally, paradigmatically, not about structure-that is, 
not about things like federalism, bicameralism, representation, 
and constitutional amendment. Most of us also think that the 
Bill of Rights is not about majoritarianism…. We think the 
Bill of Rights is about individual rights, not majority rights. I 
think that is wrong. The essence of the Bill of Rights and the 
essence of the Constitution are profoundly populist, 
democratic, majoritarian, and structural.32 
 
                                                 
31 This juridic (and, in some ways ironically Jeffersonian insofar as Jefferson opined that 
one of the benefits of a Bill of Rights may be their application by judges) reading of the Bill 
of Rights deprives it of its real significance for constitutional maintenance as a “political 
creed.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestley, 19 June 1802, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-37-02-0515 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
But these two purposes are not mutually exclusive, even if disharmonic. See my discussion 
of Jefferson’s appeal to the community concerning the Alien and Sedition Acts. See infra p. 
14 and notes 39–41; see also PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 2–4; see generally JACOBSOHN, 
supra note 18 (discussing the harmonic and disharmonic components of constitutional 
identities). 
32 Comments, supra note 29, at 100. 
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Amar concludes that we should approach the Bill of Rights as a program of 
“popular education”: an idea that “resurfaces over and over in the Bill of 
Rights.”33 
 
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS A TEXT OF CIVIC INSTRUCTION 
 
How should we read the Bill of Rights, if not as a set of legal 
prescriptions directed to judges? The Bill of Rights is both an instrument and 
evidence of the Constitution’s civic character. From the perspective of civic 
constitutionalism, the constitutional text is not just a collection of legal rules 
to be applied by judges; it is also an important part of the civic educational 
enterprise. Consequently, the civic educative part of the constitutional order 
extends to how we read and understand the text itself—as a text of civic 
instruction. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights is a piece of this fundamentally 
civic understanding of the constitutional order. Approached through the lens 
of civic constitutionalism, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights tells us to read 
the Bill of Rights as an ambitious program of civic education in the key tenets 
of the constitutional project.34 
As Rousseau counseled in The Government of Poland, a chief 
component of constitutional design must be how to facilitate the civic literacy 
of citizens of new regimes.35 Highlighting this question has a profound effect 
on how we understand the constitutional order generally. The question of how 
we can create a constitutionally literate citizenry is a long and venerable one 
in constitutional theory. Sadly, it is not a question that much concerns 
contemporary constitutional theorists, who are instead often preoccupied 
with arcane disputes about the methodology of constitutional interpretation 
by judges.  
It is easy to forget, especially in the shadow of the Juridic 
Constitution, that one of the most important functions of constitutional texts 
qua texts is to promote this very literacy. The civic import of preambles, if 
lost or irrelevant to most twenty-first century judges, was thoroughly 
apparent at the founding. As Konig writes, “the opening paragraphs of the 
                                                 
33 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1210 
(1991) [hereinafter Bill of Rights as Constitution]. 
34 PEOPLING, supra note 1; see also Preliminaries, supra note 1, at 41–69. 
35 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND (Willmoore Kendall trans., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1985) (1782). 
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new state constitutions” in which framers “proclaimed what appear to twenty-
first century eyes to be idealistic but unenforceable principles and rights” are 
“among the most misunderstood and unappreciated features of the 
republicanism of the revolution.” 36  Breslin has likewise observed that 
preambles reflect a view of “the public text as a considerable force in resisting 
the rise of tyranny” or as reflecting faith in the text “as a public 
pronouncement.” 37  On this view, a preamble “serves important civic 
lessons,” in part by teaching us about the past and by serving as “constant 
reminders[] of our constitutional ambitions and principles.”38 It is easier to 
appreciate the civic import of these provisions when we recall too that in the 
colonial era, “our modern notion of a judiciary that might review and void 
statutory law existed only in incipient form.”39 David Thomas Konig notes, 
“[B]ecause these provisions were not judicially enforceable, it is easy to 
dismiss them as mere verbiage.” 40  Preambles were meant not to create 
judicially enforceable rights but rather “to rouse the citizenry to their exercise 
of republican citizenship.”41 Thus, “Our Constitution was self-consciously 
written down to teach successive generations of Americans about their rights 
and responsibilities, about the Blessings of Liberty.”42 
Preambular provisions in constitutional texts are important, if not 
critical, elements in these initiatives of civic education, often explaining 
elemental precepts of constitutional governance in general and ambitious 
terms. In addition, they include higher-order instructions about how to read 
the constitutional text of which they are a part. Read as calls to civic life and 
engagement, preambles help to install and reinforce a civic culture of 
constitutionalism.  
Both Jefferson and Madison anticipated that civic education would 
play an important, if not critical, role in constitutional maintenance.43  In 
Jefferson’s words, “[W]ritten constitutions may be violated in moments of 
passion or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful 
                                                 
36 Konig, supra note 20, at 1318. 
37 BRESLIN, supra note 2, at 55. 
38 Id. at 52. 
39 Konig, supra note 20, at 1318.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1319. 
42 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 
573 (1994) [hereinafter Posterity]. 
43 See GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY: 
CONSTITUTING THE AMERICAN MIND (2015). 
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may again rally and recall the people; they fix too for the people the principles 
of their political creed.”44 On this reasoning: 
 
The words of the Bill of Rights would themselves educate 
Americans; hence the appropriateness of didactic, 
nonlegalistic phrases such as “a well regulated Militia is 
necessary to the security of a free State.” Such maxims were 
the heart and soul of early state constitutions. Virginia’s 
famous 1776 Declaration of Rights even featured a maxim 
about the need for maxims! “No free government, or the 
blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by . . 
. virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles.”45 
 
As a summary of those fundamental principles, a Bill of Rights “will 
be the first lesson of the young citizens.”46 As Amar notes: 
 
Patrick Henry and John Marshall agreed on very little in the 
Virginia ratifying convention, but when Henry declared that 
“there are certain maxims by which every wise and 
enlightened people will regulate their conduct,” Marshall 
went out of his way to agree that such maxims “are necessary 
in any government, but more essential to a democracy than to 
any other.”47 
 
Madison likewise alluded to the civic educational aspects of the Bill 
of Rights when, finally persuaded to draft a bill of rights, he wrote that “[t]he 
political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the 
character of fundamental maxims of a free Government, and as they become 
incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest 
and passion.”48 In Colleen Sheehan’s words, “Over time, a bill of rights acts 
                                                 
44 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestley, 19 June 1802, supra note 31.  
45 Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1208. 
46 Id. (quoting HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 31 (Robert A. Goldwin 
& William A. Schambra eds., 1985)). 
47 Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1209 (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 137, 223 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888)). 
48 As Elkin has concluded, for Madison: “[H]ow best to secure fundamental rights—
surely one of the broad purposes of republican government and thus essential to 
understanding how to design it—is not a task for legal reason.” STEPHEN L. ELKIN, 
RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON 
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as a kind of republican schoolmaster, serving as a civic lexicon by which the 
people teach themselves the grammar and meaning of freedom.”49 Another 
well-known quote by Madison makes a similar point: 
 
What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in 
popular Governments? . . . 1. The political truths declared in 
that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of 
fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become 
incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the 
impulses of interest and passion. 2. [Whenever] usurped acts 
of the Government [occur], a bill of rights will be a good 
ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.50 
 
This is an important point in establishing civic literacy in citizens. By 
elaborating upon and making public the criteria for constitutional success, the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights educates citizens into the meaning of 
constitutional precepts and gives them tools for the task of assessment it 
assigns to them. Ultimately, it provides the skills and information necessary 
for citizens to assume their constitutional responsibility to tend to the 
constitutional project.51 
Importantly, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights and the Bill of Rights 
also go some way to defining what success—and failure—mean in 
constitutional terms. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights implicitly defines 
constitutional success (and likewise, constitutional failure) in terms of ends: 
discernible progress toward the achievements specified as desirable in the 
Preamble. The beneficent ends referenced by the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights are the ends set forth in the Great Preamble. As judges frequently 
remark, the ends identified by the Great Preamble—to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
                                                 
100 (2006). Instead, “[i]t is ‘political law,’ not ‘ordinary law,’ and as such it must be 
interpreted by the various political organs that it calls into being, not just courts.” Id. at 99. 
49  COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN SELF-
GOVERNMENT 108 (2009). 
50 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON: VOLUME 11, at 298–99 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 
1977); see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1209 (noting as further 
evidence of the civic character of constitutional maintenance that such appeals are to the 
community). 
51 PEOPLING supra note 1, at 25–27. I use the word “tend” in a particular way here, as 
showing solicitude for the constitutional project. 
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defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity—are difficult to comprehend as individual rights 
that can be pressed in courts. They are programmatic ends, statements about 
desirable states of being, that have the character of political ambitions more 
than legal rules and whose meaning is necessarily subject to reasonable 
disagreement by all members of the community. Their realization, in other 
words, is beyond the ken of judicial actors.52 
Equally significant, progress towards the achievement of these 
constitutional ends cannot be settled by any metric located in law or utilized 
by courts.53  Assessments of constitutional success and failure require an 
exercise of judgment: “Success and failures are not absolute states, but are 
instead matters of judgment, in part because the terms are political constructs, 
not bright-line legal tests, and in part because success does not require 
perfection.”54 “Except in truly rare instances, whether we have succeeded or 
failed in achieving a constitutional way of life will involve crude and tentative 
assessments based on ambiguous evidence.” 55  Again, these kinds of 
assessments are truly and in the largest sense political questions, 
insusceptible of judicial resolution. Their resolution requires an exercise of 
political and civic judgment, not the application of legal rules; indeed, our 
courts have had little use for either Preamble for precisely this reason.56 
Conceived in this light, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is not simply 
to impose judicially enforceable limits on government but also to remind 
                                                 
52  LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). Sager’s under-enforcement thesis holds that some 
principles of political justice, to which the Constitution is committed in abstract, “are 
wrapped in complex choices of strategy and responsibility that are properly the responsibility 
of popular political institutions.” Id. at 87. 
53 See generally JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 147–48 (2010) (discussing the Directive 
Principles of Social Policy in the Irish Constitution or the Directives of State Policy identified 
in Article 4 of the Indian Constitution); PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 45. 
54 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 176.  
A related difficulty goes directly to the meaning and measurement of 
failure: How would we know if we have failed? How do we distinguish 
between constitutional inadequacies, defects, imperfections, deficiencies, 
flaws, blemishes, shortcomings—and constitutional failures? What would 
constitute evidence of failure? Where would we find evidence of it? How 
much evidence is necessary to substantiate the proposition? 
Id.; see also Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2093, 2111 (2002). 
55 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 176. 
56 Id. at 41. 
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governed and governor alike about the importance of constitutional literacy 
for the durability of the new constitutional order. Hemberger notes: “[A]nti-
federalists demanded a Bill of Rights because they wanted Americans to have 
a shared understanding of the appropriate limits of governmental power.”57 
Hence, “[t]o identify when the national government had exceeded the bounds 
of its legitimate authority, citizens needed a ‘plain, strong, and accurate 
criterion’ and a ‘permanent landmark.’” 58  And Amar notes too, that 
“Madison had pointed to the importance of ‘public opinion’ in making the 
Bill of Rights more than a mere ‘paper barrier.’”59 
To reiterate: a juridic understanding of the Constitution and of the Bill 
of Rights in particular, as legal limitations on state power (a reading greatly 
facilitated by the incorporation doctrine60), has little use for the Preamble to 
the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, a civic constitutionalist reading of the 
Constitution and of the Bill of Rights gives both meaning and purpose to the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. It reveals the Bill of Rights as part of a civic 
constitutionalist strategy for advancing the project of constitutional 
maintenance, conceived as a significantly more expansive and ambitious 
undertaking than constitutional interpretation by judges. Civic 
constitutionalism requires that we recalibrate how we think about the Bill of 
Rights, less in terms of individual rights and more in terms of creating and 
maintaining a shared civic identity, or as an ambitious program of civic 
education. 
A close reading of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights reveals four parts 
that look different when read civically rather than juridically. The Preamble 
to the Bill of Rights announces that it has two objectives: “to prevent 
misconstruction or abuse” of the Constitution’s grant of powers, and to 
extend “public confidence in the Government” by seeking to “ensure the 
beneficent ends of” government. To those ends, it proposes “declaratory” and 
“restrictive” clauses “in addition to, and amendment of” the constitutional 
text. None of these claims is as self-evident or as uncomplicated as it might 
seem. 
 
                                                 
57 Hemberger, supra note 9, at 148. 
58 Id. (citing specific speeches by anti-Federalists).  
59 Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1207. 
60 See generally Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 33 (explaining that the 
incorporation doctrine can be read juridically as a limitation on state power). 
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A. “Misconstruction or Abuse” 
 
Like the other civic-oriented provisions of the constitutional 
document, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is a “statement about the 
Constitution in its entirety.” 61  Somewhat unusually for a preamble, the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights simultaneously looks backward, in the sense 
of instructing readers how to read the material that precedes it (Articles I–
VII), and forward, in the sense of instructing readers how to read what follows 
it (Amendments I–X). 62  The Preamble to the Bill of Rights begins by 
announcing a desire on the part of some states to “prevent misconstruction or 
abuse” of the powers delegated by the Constitution to the new national 
government. The narrower reading this elicits recalls the jealousy and fears 
of state governments, and of citizens, of an avaricious national government 
that would be disinclined to respect the limits of its powers. It thus instructs 
readers to adopt a reading of Articles I through VII that guards against overly 
capacious understandings about the reach of federal power. In other words, 
the Preamble to the Bill of Rights advances a general rule of constitutional 
construction; 63  grants of authority to the central government should be 
construed in ways that account for two other constitutional imperatives—
respect for the states as sovereign political communities (a rule regarding 
federalism), and respect for individual liberty (a rule regarding rights). The 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights also tells citizens how to read the individual 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that follow it. It tells us these provisions are 
likewise geared to the prevention of misconstruction and abuse of power, and 
in doing so it tells us something about both the proper objects of federal 
power and the limited reach of those powers.64 
                                                 
61 Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes Interpret the Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 297, 305 
(2011). 
62 The structure of this reading is similar to how Maryland proposed we should read the 
necessary and proper clause in McCulloch in the sense that Maryland wanted to read the 
clause as modifying/restricting the entire catalogue of powers that preceded it textually. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see also Burt Neuborne, “The House was Quiet 
and the World was Calm the Reader Became the Book” - Reading the Bill of Rights as a 
Poem, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2004) (reading the Bill of Rights as a single text, rather than 
serially). 
63  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, YET ANOTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001) (distinguishing constitutional construction 
from constitutional interpretation). 
64 See infra pp. 31–32. 
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The Preamble to the Bill of Rights is more concerned with the 
integrity of the constitutional project. It speaks simultaneously to the object 
of constitutional maintenance, conceived as preserving limitations on power, 
and to the mechanisms of maintenance (civic knowledge). It imagines that 
the mechanisms for maintaining the Constitution must include public 
knowledge of, and responsibility for enforcing, these limits. Both are 
evidence of a concern with the temporality of constitutional maintenance, or 
a concern about maintaining the Constitution through time, in a way 
consistent with its essential aims and the possibility that doing so will be 
corrupted by human ambition unless checked by a vigilant citizenry. 
In announcing a purpose to prevent “misconstruction or abuse” of the 
Constitution’s grants of power, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights provides a 
set of interpretive instructions, presumably from governed to governors, 
about how to read the text. 65  I say “presumably” to highlight an open 
question—one that goes directly to part of what is at stake in adopting a 
juridic or civic reading of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights: are these 
instructions directed to judges or to citizens? The way we write a text, 
especially a constitutional text, is greatly influenced by who we think its 
readers will be. When we call a text into being we simultaneously call into 
being its readers. 66  Constitutions, like all texts, envision (or create) a 
particular relationship between author and reader, one in which the text 
interacts with, “instructs,” “directs,” or “controls” the reader in certain sorts 
of ways and on specific terms.67 It is important to note as well that this 
process is simultaneously one of inclusion and exclusion. A juridic reading 
of the constitutional text assumes that its primary audience will be judges. It 
assumes, in other words, a particular understanding about what sort of an 
activity constitutional maintenance is (legal) and to whom it should be 
entrusted (judges and lawyers). It is a conception of constitutional 
maintenance that makes little provision for constitutional literacy in its 
                                                 
65  It also reflects another fundamental assumption about the effort to construct a 
constitutional community through a written text—that there are correct and incorrect 
readings about what the text requires or forbids or, at a minimum, better and worse 
interpretations of textual commands.  
66 UMBERTO ECO ET AL., INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION 45–88 (Stefan 
Collini ed., 1992). 
67  Andrea K. Newlyn, Redefining ‘Rudimentary’ Narrative: Women’s Nineteenth-
Century Manuscript Cookbooks, in THE RECIPE READER: NARRATIVES – CONTEXTS – 
TRADITIONS 12–31 (Janet Floyd & Laurel Forster eds., 2003).  
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citizens and indeed constructs barriers of education and expertise that serve 
as powerful disincentives for citizens to assume responsibility for tending to 
the Constitution.68 
But the language of “misconstruction” or “abuse” is better 
apprehended as a statement about the Civic Constitution, i.e., as a broad and 
expansive instruction to a robust and engaged citizenry about the meaning of 
the Constitution and the nature, sources, and limits of governmental power. 
Moreover, the language implicitly assumes that the power to adjudge 
misconstructions and abuses of grants of power to the national government is 
lodged in the people, a civic enterprise as much as a legal one. So, in addition 
to telling us how to read the Bill of Rights, a civic reading of the Preamble to 
the Bill of Rights tells us who its readers are, or who they should be.  
What evidence do we have for this claim? First, the terms 
“misconstruction” and “abuse” evoke assessments grounded in judgment, 
uncertainty, and nuance rather than the precise and certain application of legal 
rules that yield dichotomous results.69 We may say, for instance, that a judge 
has misinterpreted a statute or a specific constitutional provision, but when 
we misconstrue, we reference a different and less straightforward sort of 
claim. To misconstrue typically has two senses—the broader one I describe 
here—and a narrower one typically associated with the language of 
grammatical error. If the narrower reading seems to capture the character of 
legality, if not legalism, the larger one suggests a broader metric. And given 
the construction of the phrasing that couples the term “misconstruction” with 
“abuse,” the larger meaning should be preferred. The term “abuse” covers 
even more ground, referring, for example, to “[d]eparture from reasonable 
use; immoderate or improper use.”70  The language of reasonableness, of 
immoderation and impropriety, educes a civic calculation more than a legal 
one especially since, as I explain further below, its referents (the individual 
provisions of the Bill of Rights) should be approached as political ambitions 
as well as enforceable rights. 
                                                 
68 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 38–42. 
69  See Wayne D. Moore, Constitutional Citizenship, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: 
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE, supra note 1 (discussing 
the concept of dichotomy in constitutional reasoning). 
70Abuse, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/abuser 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
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Second, my claim about the civic meaning of the Bill of Rights is 
supported by the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Preamble to 
the Bill of Rights. In the earliest versions, Madison proposed a revision to the 
opening preamble, so that it would read: 
 
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, 
that all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived 
from, the people. 
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for 
the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of 
life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, 
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and 
indefeasible right to reform or change their Government, 
whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of 
its institution.71 
 
This new text, in Madison’s plan, would immediately precede the well-
known phrase “We the People” in the Great Preamble. 72  This matters 
because, located here, it would be coupled with other broad statements of 
aspiration and civic ambition; it would take on a similar republican and 
instructional character. In other words, its location in the Great Preamble 
speaks to its civic purpose.73 Similarly, most of the individual amendments 
were first proposed as amendments to Article I, Section 9, i.e., as discrete and 
individual limits on congressional power. David Currie suggests, “The 
decision to propose the amendments as separate articles, while hotly 
controverted, was based on stylistic rather than substantive considerations.”74 
In some ways Currie’s description misses the point: removing them and 
collecting them together facilitates their civic purpose by making them a 
                                                 
71 HERMAN VANDENBURG AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 185 (1897). 
72 JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra, note 10, at 441. 
73  See Destro, supra note 10, at 381 n.22 (discussing the legislative history of the 
Preamble of the Bill of Rights). 
74 Currie, supra note 10, at 856. Amar likewise agrees, “There is no evidence that this 
change was anything but aesthetic.” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 143 (1998) [hereinafter CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION]. Amar 
further agrees that the change was more than simply aesthetic, however, noting that 
“[n]evertheless, the change had the unhappy effect of blurring the implicit rule of 
construction at work” (i.e., of limiting the application of the Bill of Rights to the federal 
government). Id.  
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single, memorable text, one that invites and is amenable to recitation and 
repetition by citizens as a civic creed. The stylistic change was necessary to 
advance a substantive purpose. As Amar observes, “[A] bill of rights was 
written to be memorized and internalized by ordinary citizens.”75 
Finally, it is worth noting that each of the three paragraphs in the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights makes explicit reference to the People in their 
civic, sovereign, and collective capacity. By invoking the sovereign “people” 
in each referenced paragraph, it assumes that a final power of judgment about 
whether such powers have been misconstrued or abused rests in the sovereign 
citizenry. Each paragraph reads more as a political maxim, or as an expansive 
claim about the nature and purposes of constitutional government as a way 
of organizing political community, than as a legal rule. Amar has described 
this sentiment as “populist” in character, but the better word is civic, which 
implies and emphasizes our collective responsibility as citizens for 
superintending the constitutional project. 
 
B. “Public Confidence and Beneficent Ends” 
 
That the power to adjudge misconstructions and abuses is as much civic 
as juridical in character is further illustrated by the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights’s several audiences. One audience for the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights is Congress itself, as illuminated by Madison in introducing the Bill 
of Rights to Congress: 
 
I appeal to those gentlemen who have heard the voice of their 
country, to those who have attended the debates of the State 
conventions, whether the amendments now proposed are not 
those most strenuously required by the opponents of the 
constitution? It was wished that some security should be given 
for those great and essential rights which they have been 
taught to believe were in danger . . . . Have not the people been 
told that the rights of conscience, the freedom of speech, the 
liberty of the press, and trial by jury, were in jeopardy? That 
they ought not to adopt the constitution until these important 
rights were secured to them?76 
 
                                                 
75 CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 131. 
76  KENNETH SHEAR, UNORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING 90 (Alice Porter ed., 2009) 
(quoting ANNALS OF CONGRESS 746 (1789)). 
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Madison’s appeal to his fellow representatives explicitly references the 
public’s concerns about the new constitutional order, strongly suggesting that 
the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to address those concerns and in so doing 
to help cement civic fidelity to that order. 
Another audience was the states. As Kenneth Shear observes, 
“Congress acknowledged that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to address 
the recommendations of states . . . .”77 Calls for a Bill of Rights, at least as 
described by some Federalists, were located in a “spirit of jealousy”78 and 
centered, understandably, on concerns about the relative sovereignties and 
competencies of the federal government and of state governments. On this 
reading, the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights was to reassure the states 
of the importance and inviolability of limits on federal power. As a strategy 
for limiting federal power—or for preserving state autonomy—this is a 
device that leans heavily on the fact that limits on federal power are 
transparent and public, easily referenced by citizens and not, contra 
Hamilton, in the complexities of constitutional theory or architecture.79 
Nevertheless, the aim of establishing “public confidence” tells us the 
primary audience for the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is not Congress or the 
states but citizens—thus reinforcing Jefferson’s description of the Bill of 
Rights as civic educative and preceptorial. 80  This is evident when the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights speaks of “extending the ground of public 
confidence in the Government” by ensuring “the beneficent ends of its 
institution.” Public confidence in the constitutional project is best secured, on 
this logic, by making it more likely than not that we will realize our collective 
aims (those identified by the Great Preamble), achieving a more perfect 
union. The chief purpose of the Bill of Rights, then, is to advance the success 
of the constitutional project by helping us to achieve its beneficent ends, and 
those ends are best secured by making them public and by so doing educating 
the people about their significance. The unspoken assumption (shared by both 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 One source of the quote is: Alexander Hamilton, On the Adoption of the Constitution 
at the New York Constitutional convention (June 24, 1788). Another usage is in 
Commonwealth v. Dallas, 4 U.S. 229, 230 (Pa. 1801). 
79 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (1788). Madison’s view was more 
complicated. See SHEEHAN, supra note 49, at 108; THOMAS, supra note 43, at 100.  
80 SHEAR, supra note 76, at 198 (noting that “[t]he preamble mentions too that the 
purpose of the Bill of Rights included ‘extending the ground of public confidence in the 
Government’”).  
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Federalists and anti-Federalists), in other words, is that the best guarantee of 
constitutional success is a vigilant, informed, and responsible citizenry. 
This last point is too often overlooked in studies of constitutional 
government in general and of constitutional maintenance in particular. It is 
much easier to maintain the constitutional enterprise, and equally to secure 
civic confidence in the desirability and durability of constitutional 
government, if the project can plausibly claim some measure of success in 
realizing constitutional ends, or some measure of success in actually 
achieving a constitutional way of life.81 So, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights 
identifies constitutional success as an important element of civic maintenance 
because success helps to establish and sustain civic fidelity to a constitutional 
way of life. 
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights tells us that one of the purposes of 
the Bill of Rights is to advance public confidence in the prospect of achieving 
the ends identified in the Great Preamble and to give the people themselves 
a significant measure of responsibility for realizing them. Taking the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights seriously, as the Civic Constitution asks us to 
do, therefore requires us to think carefully about its relationship to the Great 
Preamble. Some scholars have detected some tension between the two 
preambles. As Amar describes it, the discontinuity resides in the Great 
Preamble’s deeply populist sentiments (“We the People” and the related 
claims of sovereignty) and the apparent individualistic character of the Bill 
of Rights. As I discuss below, for Amar this inconsistency is misleading 
because, in his view, the Bill of Rights is less insistently individualistic in 
nature than is commonly supposed. Instead, understood correctly, it is of a 
piece with the Great Preamble because both are fundamentally populist in 
character: “The Bill of Rights is not about individual rights and not 
                                                 
81 But see CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (4th 
ed. 1950) (comparing the post-World War Two literature on constitutional reconstruction). 
Barber’s definition of constitutional success is similar in many ways; it includes, for 
example, establishing a regime characterized by a “healthy politics.” Sotirios A. Barber, 
Constitutional Failure: Ultimately Attitudinal, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 14 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2015). He argues further that 
constitutional success depends ultimately on a stratum of diverse and self-critical citizens, 
who see each other as moral equals and parts of one national community. Id. at 13–28. These 
citizens, with the politicians among them, would be good-faith contestants regarding the 
meaning of the common good and the most effective means to secure it. This shows how the 
success of a constitutional democracy is more a matter of political attitudes than of 
institutional performance. 
 
26 THE OTHER PREAMBLE Vol. 2 
discontinuous with the Preamble, but rather consistent with its populist 
character.”82 Amar continues: “Whether you look at the Preamble, with its 
language ‘We the People of the United States,’ which sounds so populist, or 
Article VII, the last article of the original Constitution, the essence of the 
document, I would argue, is fundamentally participatory, democratic, and 
majoritarian at the most important level.”83 So the apparent inconsistency 
between the Great Preamble and the Bill of Rights may be reconciled by 
appealing to a higher level of abstraction (both place some significance on 
the value of popular participation in governance).84 There are also context-
specific reasons that weigh in favor of continuity: the two provisions are 
proximate in time and share the same cast of constitutional actors in their 
drafting and ratification. Similarly, we might plausibly think the same “We” 
the people are speaking, in a single voice, albeit at two distinct moments in 
constitutional time.  
Behind the claim that we should read the constitutional document to 
facilitate its consistency and coherency is the implicit assumption that 
consistency and coherency are desirable and healthy incidents of 
constitutional identity. But there are also reasons why we should not assume 
that what “We” said in the Preamble is consistent with what “We” said in the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. Many of these reasons are grounded in an 
alternative conception of constitutional identity, one that assumes the project 
of establishing identity is not confined to or definitively settled at a founding 
moment, but is instead a continuing part of the constitutional enterprise. 
These arguments caution us not to presuppose that constitutional identities 
are necessarily coherent, uniform, and stable, or that identity must cohere 
around claims, principles, and characteristics that are settled rather than 
                                                 
82 Comments, supra note 29, at 100.  
83 Id. at 101. 
84 Amar’s definition of “declaratory” likewise stresses the compatibility between the 
Preamble and the Bill of Rights in populist terms:  
Thus, our First Amendment’s language of ‘the right of the people to 
assemble’ simply made explicit at the end of the Constitution what [was] . 
. . implicit in its opening. (Many other provisions of the Bill of Rights were 
also understood as declaratory, inserted simply out of an abundance of 
caution to clarify preexisting constitutional understandings.) 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 28 (citation omitted). 
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repeatedly contested and re-negotiated. As Thomas Schelling, 85  Gary 
Jacobsohn, and others have argued, it is probably a mistake to overemphasize 
the harmonic elements of our identity at the expense of its disharmonic 
elements: both are common, if not indispensable, components of 
comprehensive constitutional identities.86 Additionally, assumptions about 
consistency and coherency thus appear not to comprehend the Preamble to 
the Bill of Rights itself as a site or an object of continuing constitutional 
conflict. 
Once we perceive that constitutional identities may have disharmonic 
elements, it becomes possible to imagine that what “We” said in the Great 
Preamble (or who we said “We” are) may not be entirely consistent with what 
“We” said (or who we said “We” are) in the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. 
For example, we might read the Great Preamble as establishing a national 
civic identity as well as incorporating an important principle of national 
citizenship.87 But given the context of conditional ratification that surrounded 
Madison’s introduction of the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, 
we might read the Preamble to the Bill of Rights as an appeal to a conception 
of our identity that is located in states. On this reading, the Preamble to the 
Bill of Rights is somewhat at odds with the notion of national citizenship 
implicit in the Great Preamble. 
We should recall that contests concerning our constitutional identity 
manifest early on and prominently in constitutional debates concerning the 
drafting of the Great Preamble. At some risk of simplification, it is not too 
much to claim that these contests resulted in a Preamble in which Federalist 
understandings about the identity of the collective “We” triumphed. Recall 
the letters of Brutus, for example, who argued against the Great Preamble 
precisely because it was hostile to federalism: 
 
                                                 
85 Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 NAT’L AFF. 94, 98 
(1980), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/the-intimate-contest-for-self-
command. 
86 See JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 1–33. 
87 And that is braced later by the Fourteenth Amendment. One objection to this reading 
has always been that it sits uncomfortably with the process of ratification prescribed in 
Article VII and it is partly that inconsistency that Amar reconciles by appealing to a larger 
principle of populism. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 496 (1994) [hereinafter Consent of 
the Governed]. 
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To discover the spirit of the Constitution, it is of the first 
importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has 
in view. These are expressed in the Preamble . . . If the end of 
the government is to be learned from these words, which are 
clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every 
object which is embraced by any government . . . The courts, 
therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the 
Constitution, and will give every part of it such an 
explanation, as will give latitude to every department under it, 
to take cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the 
general and national concerns of the union, but also of such as 
relate to the administration of private justice, and to regulating 
the internal and local affairs of the different parts.88 
 
In the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, by way of contrast, we see a 
reassertion of the anti-Federalist understanding of our constitutional identity. 
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights reflected the concerns of those who wanted 
a “guarantee that federal power would not be utilized to preempt important 
state laws, institutions, and values.” 89  In other words, part of the civic 
educational message of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is the importance 
of federalism as an enduring and foundational constitutional value just as, 
perhaps, the civic educational message in the Fourteenth Amendment might 
be closer to the opposite. 
So the civic story90 related by the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, in 
contrast to the Great Preamble, might be about the importance of federalism 
to our constitutional identity. On this approach, the story of the Preamble to 
the Bill of Rights about who “We” are is at some odds with the understanding 
of the collective “We” in the Great Preamble. It reminds us that who we are 
is an enduring object of constitutional contest.91 
                                                 
88  BRUTUS, ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 11 (1788), http://www.constitution.org 
/afp/brutus11.htm. See Eric M. Axler, Note, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth 
Amendment: The Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 431, 439–40 n.30 (2000) (“Among other objections to the proposed constitution, Brutus 
maintained that the spirit of the Constitution, as announced in the Pre-amble, would infringe 
on the rights of the states . . . Brutus supported this assertion by emphasizing that the 
Preamble speaks of ‘We the People,’ rather than in terms of the states.”). 
89 Destro, supra note 10, at 381 n.22. 
90 I take the language of “story” from Breslin’s discussion of preambles as stories in 
Worlds. BRESLIN, supra note 2, at 51. 
91 In much the same way, the Reconstruction Amendments likewise remind us that 
fundamental issues about constitutional identity, in this case, concerning the tension between 
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The discontinuity between this message and the Great Preamble (and 
later the Reconstruction Amendments)92  may help to explain the relative 
insignificance of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights to contemporary 
understandings of the constitutional project. When faced with the prospect of 
constitutional inconsistencies, many of us assume we must minimize or 
harmonize them. One way to do so, as Amar has shown us, is to fold more 
particular conflicts into a higher level of abstraction or to find some point of 
commonality that undergirds, explains, and subsumes supposed conflicts.93 
Another might be simply to deny that there is any conflict or to ignore it by 
dismissing the Preamble to the Bill of Rights altogether.  
But we should resist the temptation to paper over constitutional 
disharmonies. Disharmonies recognize diverse aspects of our constitutional 
identity; it is a mistake to assume they were settled conclusively at the first 
founding (or the second, or the third).94 A civic constitutionalist approach to 
the Constitution reveals that the Great Preamble and the Preamble to the Bill 
of Rights both seek to constitute the political order around particular sorts of 
civic lessons.95  Behind them rest different understandings about who the 
                                                 
our national and our state selves, is never fully settled—not by the Great Preamble, nor by 
the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. All involve conflict about the content of the civic 
educative message that the Constitution itself was meant to convey. Sometimes that conflict 
manifests at the level of constitutional amendments (as with the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh 
Amendment, and the Reconstruction Amendments), at others, in interpretations regarding 
the text’s meaning (examples might include recent case law concerning Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965). See, e.g., Shelby County v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617–22 (2013); see also Alexander Tsesis, Principled 
Governance: The American Creed and Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 
715–19 (2009). 
92 As Amar notes, in “pervasive and powerful ways . . . the Fourteenth Amendment has 
reconstructed the meaning of the Bill of Rights in both the popular and the legal mind.” Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1284 
(1992). 
93 Are we also to assume that these juridical conflicts can be settled by judges? An 
example of such a tendency may be the Court’s recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
94 See JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 1–32.  
95  Additionally, we might begin to think that neither the Great Preamble nor the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights, taken alone and independently, expresses a single, coherent 
message. The Great Preamble identifies several objects as part of our pursuit of a more 
perfect union. Some of these objects may pull in different directions, thus indicating that we 
desire many things, some of which may be incompatible with each other, or at least in some 
tension with others. In this case, though, we should read them in ways that emphasize their 
consistency, a consistency that resides in their civic message about the limits of constitutional 
powers. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984). 
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people are and around what propositions the people are constituted. This 
should remind us of a point too often forgotten in the process of constitution 
making: preambles are sites of contest as well as tools in contests over 
constitutional design and especially in design decisions that go to the heart of 
constitutional identity and the definition of our constitutional selves.96 
 
C. “Declaratory and Restrictive” 
 
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights announces that adoption of the Bill 
of Rights will add “declaratory and restrictive” clauses to the constitutional 
text. There are two questions that we confront immediately. First, what do 
these terms mean? Second, which provisions in the Bill of Rights should we 
regard as restrictive and which as declaratory? Answers to these questions 
depend in part upon whether we adopt a juridic or a civic reading of the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. 
 1. The meaning of “declaratory.” Our first question should be: 
What does “declaratory” mean in constitutional terms? Amar’s take, one of 
the few to consider the issue, is that declaratory provisions aim to “clarify” 
what is already in the text: “Many other provisions of the Bill of Rights were 
. . . understood as declaratory, inserted simply out of an abundance of caution 
to clarify preexisting constitutional understandings.”97 Intimately connected 
to this understanding of “declaratory” is the concept of civic education that 
occurs, in large measure, through these acts of declaration. This declarative 
function thus views the Bill of Rights as having a purpose that extends well 
beyond judicial enforcement of its specific provisions as restrictions on 
federal power. Instead, it sees the Bill of Rights as part of the great project of 
constitutional education: “[T]he very words of the Bill of Rights would 
themselves educate Americans—indeed, the Bill of Rights was written in 
clear, grand phrases that could be easily memorized and internalized (like 
scripture or poetry) in classrooms across the republic.”98 Amar’s definition 
                                                 
96 So maybe we should think of the Reconstruction Amendments, or at least Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as preambular provisions as well? I don’t go so far, but I do 
think it is instructive to think of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution’s several 
preambles, to be “a statement about the Constitution in its entirety.” Rubin, supra note 61, 
at 305. 
97 CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 28. 
98 Posterity, supra note 42, at 573–74; see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 
33, at 1154. 
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of “declaratory” likewise stresses the compatibility between the Great 
Preamble and the Bill of Rights in populist terms: 
 
Thus, our First Amendment’s language of “the right of the 
people to assemble” simply made explicit at the end of the 
Constitution what [was] . . . implicit in its opening. Many 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights were also understood as 
declaratory, inserted simply out of an abundance of caution to 
clarify preexisting constitutional understandings.99 
 
Asking this question as an inquiry into the Civic Constitution also 
alerts us to the possibility that the meaning of those declarations is not 
obvious but is instead itself the object of constitutional disagreement. 
Moreover, a civic constitutionalist approach to the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights tells us that the meaning and function of “declaration” should not be 
hitched to a priori assumptions about what substantive point is declared. The 
amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights might “declare” things about 
the meaning and substance of the constitutional order that go well beyond 
clarifying or making explicit what is fairly implicit in the rest of the 
constitutional text. This is a familiar point of conflict in debates concerning 
the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Amendments. 100  They might 
declare principles that, far from “conservatory” in character, instead 
contravene or contradict or unsettle constitutional claims that were (thought 
to be) widely agreed upon and assumed to mean something else. They may 
declare principles, in other words, that contest rather than reaffirm prior 
constitutional meanings. To be more specific, the Preamble to the Bill of 
Rights might declare an understanding of the constitutional order that 
disputes the vision implicit in the Great Preamble. 
Hence, to approach the Preamble to the Bill of Rights and the Bill of 
Rights as instruments of civic education is to invite us to see the purpose of 
“declaration” in an explicitly political light—as instruments and as evidence 
of political and civic conflict over the very nature and identity of the 
constitutional order writ large. In other words, the language of declaration, 
intuitively benign insofar as it suggests the simple purpose to clarify, may 
                                                 
99 Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1154. 
100 See PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 287 n.270 (regarding the disagreement between 
Walter F. Murphy and Mark Bandon about the constitutionality of the Reconstruction 
Amendments). 
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instead signal profound disagreement about what principles need to be 
declared. It is a strategy in an area of constitutional dispute. Ostensibly 
declaratory provisions may in fact embrace a contested understanding of the 
constitutional order and several of its cardinal principles. 
Moreover, these conflicts are themselves a kind of civic education 
insofar as key tenets of the putative constitutional order compete for 
recognition and fidelity. These conflicts are also an exercise in constitutional 
maintenance or a strategy of constitutional maintenance rooted in conflict and 
contestation about the meaning of the constitutional order and about what it 
is that “We” must maintain.101 To ignore the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is 
to overlook significant points of conflict and disagreement about elemental 
constitutional principles in favor of a misguided quest for constitutional 
symmetry. 
 2. The meaning of “restrictive.” The second question is: what 
does “restrictive” mean? Restrictive of what? The obvious answer is that such 
clauses restrict the reach of the powers assigned to the new national 
government in Articles I-VII; in this way, the individual provisions of the Bill 
of Rights should be regarded as limits on powers that are manifest in and 
operationalized as rights claims by individuals. It is in this sense that we 
should understand the Bill of Rights as essentially restrictive in character—
placing outside limits on grants of authority to the national government. 
These rights-claim readings are deeply juridic in character because they read 
the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights as creating rights claims that 
can be realized through litigation and they disregard or have no use for those 
parts of the Bill of Rights, such as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, that 
cannot easily be made to conform to this model. Recalling Corwin’s famous 
metaphor, this approach sees rights as islands in an ocean of powers;102 it 
                                                 
101 In Constitutional Democracy, Walter Murphy pointed to several examples in which 
the process of constitutional change involved neither the extreme means of civil war or 
passive acquiescence, but instead a process of “mutual adjustment,” as happened in Germany 
following reunification or in the United States following Brown v. Board of Education. 
MURPHY, supra note 19; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Indeed, 
Murphy stressed how often constitutional change occurs through this process of adjustment. 
MURPHY, supra note 19, at 503–04. But the process of amendment can be a battleground 
over contested meaning as much as a process of mutual adjustment, and the benign language 
of adjustment can hide or minimize the fact of conflict.  
102  Edward S. Corwin famously described two alternative understandings of our 
constitutional order. In one, rights are islands in an ocean of powers; a successful rights claim 
by a litigant required the litigant to land on an island. In the other, powers were islands in an 
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understands rights as exceptions to powers or as trumps on powers. But as I 
discuss below,103 this may also distort the meaning of some provisions, such 
as the First and Second Amendments. 
A civic reading of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, in contrast, 
offers up a somewhat different understanding of the word “restrictive.” It 
suggests that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are not trumps on, or 
exceptions to, grants of power but rather are definitive, or constitutive, of 
those powers proper.104 This says something not only about the reach of 
powers (and of rights) but also about the ontological status of rights as 
“preconstitutional.” We might argue, following this line, that the liberties 
identified in the Bill of Rights constitute a judgment “by We the People as a 
Sovereign High Court that certain natural or fundamental rights already 
existed.”105 This assumes that rights predate power (presumably because the 
delegation of power comes from a sovereign invested with rights as a very 
condition of its sovereignty). There is little if any indication of this logic in 
the final language of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, but Madison’s first 
drafts suggest this, especially where they declare that “all power is originally 
vested in, and consequently derived from, the people” and where they 
announce “that the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible 
right to reform or change their government.”106 Such claims are additional 
evidence for the civic character of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, for they 
stand as meta claims about the nature and sources of rights in a constitutional 
state—claims highly didactic (and declaratory of first principles) in character. 
                                                 
ocean of rights. The metaphor, in effect, describes two different default options. WALTER 
MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 56 (4th ed. 2008). 
103 See infra notes 122–36 and accompanying text. 
104 I have in mind something similar to Barber’s argument that “[t]he Constitution limits 
the proper exercise of . . . powers to moves that are consistent with constitutional rights.” 
BARBER, supra note 95, at 24. On this line of analysis, Barber argues, “rights trump powers,” 
id. at 25, but I think a more nuanced description of Barber’s argument is closer to what I 
have written here: rights do not trump powers, or constitute an exception to them, so much 
as they are a part of the definition of powers. Thus, Barber later writes that “Constitutional 
powers are means to ends: more precisely, constitutional powers are authorizations to pursue 
desirable states of affairs.” Id. at 72. These ends themselves include the protection of certain 
civil liberties. See also id. at 106–07, 193–96. 
105 CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 48 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, 
First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970)). This is a position that Amar 
convincingly finds implicit in the language of the First Amendment, as well as in the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments. Amar calls this a “declaratory” judgment, thus confirming that 
declarations might announce restrictions. Id. 
106 See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 441. 
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It also recalls our earlier discussion concerning the meaning of “success” in 
constitutional terms. Here success means a regime that pursues preambular 
ends that include the protection of liberties instead of a conception in which 
liberties are exceptions to powers.107 
 3. Which is Which? A third question we might ask is which 
provisions of the Bill of Rights we ought we to regard as declaratory or 
restrictive. Some authors have argued that every provision in the Bill of 
Rights should be regarded as declaratory. Thus, writing in Weimer v. 
Bunbury,108 Judge Cooley stated that: 
 
[T]he Bills of Rights in the American Constitutions have not 
been drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old 
principles against abrogation or violation. They are 
conservatory instruments rather than reformatory; and they 
assume that the existing principles of the common law are 
ample for the protection of individual rights, when once 
incorporated in the fundamental law, and thus secured against 
violation.109 
 
One might further suggest that an approach to the Bill of Rights that stresses 
its civic educational purposes should regard all of its provisions as 
declaratory, in the sense that “to declare” means “to say something in a 
solemn and emphatic manner,”110 to publicize, to announce, to give voice to, 
and so on.111  I would add that this latter understanding of “declaratory” 
makes no assumptions, unlike the definition proffered by Judge Cooley,112 
about the conservatory character of the principles so declared. 
 On the other hand, some scholars think there is a difference in 
meaning between declaratory and restrictive. Kurt Lash, for example, has 
                                                 
107 See generally Barber, supra note 81; SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, supra note 6; RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 33–38 
(2004) (regarding an overview of a negative rights/libertarian perspectives). 
108 30 Mich. 201 (1874). 
109 Id. at 214. 
110 Declare, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/declare (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2017). 
111 This is the approach Amar seems to favor. See CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 
supra note 74, at 28; Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh Cleveland Marshall Lecture “The 
Bill of Rights and our Posterity,” 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 574 (1994) [hereinafter 
Cleveland Marshall Lecture]; see also Amar, Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, 
at 1154. 
112 See Weimer, 30 Mich. at 214. 
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argued that the Tenth Amendment is declaratory, but the Ninth Amendment 
articulates a restrictive principle.113 The Tenth declares the principle that the 
federal government has only those powers the Constitution enumerates.114 
The Ninth restricts power by declaring that rights are retained.115  “As a 
restrictive clause, the Ninth preserves the principle enshrined in the Tenth. 
Without such a rule preventing ‘misconstruction’ of the Constitution, the 
declaratory Tenth Amendment risks becoming an empty promise. Together, 
the two amendments prevent the ‘misconstruction or abuse’ of federal 
power.” 116  As this example indicates, it is certainly possible to see the 
declaratory and restrictive provisions as working in tandem. 
Following a similar logic, we might say that declaratory provisions 
are civic educational, and likely nonjusticiable, whereas restrictive provisions 
are rights claims that may be enforced as limitations on powers by judges 
against other state actors. This suggests a possible division of labor—
restrictive provisions, if read as rights provisions, fall to the care and 
enforcement of judges whereas the declaratory provisions might be the 
province of other constitutional actors and citizens. My initial sense, though, 
is that categorizing some provisions as restrictive and others as declarative is 
not a good idea, chiefly because seeing the Bill of Rights as a project in civic 
education suggests that all of its provisions are declarative of principles that 
comprise constitutional literacy in the body politic.117 Moreover, this division 
of labor is not a good idea because it necessarily results in the withering of 
public responsibility for maintaining the Constitution over time. 118  The 
Juridic Constitution does more than simply diminish the constitutional 
responsibilities of other actors with respect to the judicially enforceable 
constitution—its logic necessarily infects the entire constitutional order. It 
does this, in part, by instituting disincentives for other constitutional actors 
to take up their constitutional responsibilities,119  or what Tushnet calls a 
                                                 
113 Lash, supra note 10, at 174. 
114 Id. 
115  Lash supports the latter claim by noting that Madison thought that “preserving 
retained rights amounted to the same thing as prohibiting the undue extension of power.” Id. 
116 Id. at 176. 
117 See CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 28; Cleveland Marshall 
Lecture, supra note 111, at 574; see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 
1154. 
118 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 133–34; see generally Tushnet, supra note 30. 
119 This is especially so to the extent that our understanding of the Juridic Constitution 
yields, over time, a theory of interpretive authority that approaches judicial supremacy. And 
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problem of “overhang.”120 This is not simply a consequence of a system of 
judicial supremacy, though supremacy exacerbates it—it is a condition of the 
Juridic Constitution itself.121 The juridic reading of the Bill of Rights122 has 
overwhelmed the civic educational ambitions of the Bill of Rights, resulting 
in a constitutional order characterized by profoundly low levels of 
constitutional engagement and constitutional literacy on the part of 
citizens.123 
 4. Reading Individual Provisions. Although I cannot fully trace 
out the implications in this Article, I hope it is clear that different 
understandings of the constitutional text—civic or juridic—will also affect 
how we make sense of individual provisions in the Bill of Rights. Notable 
instances include the First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments.124 I 
have argued elsewhere that a civic constitutionalist approach to the First 
Amendment, for example, requires that we recalibrate First Amendment 
jurisprudence to promote the structural conditions that facilitate civic literacy 
and civic engagement: 
 
Understanding [these guarantees] as structural mechanisms 
that allow associational life to flourish, and thus as facilitating 
                                                 
as some have noted, “there are features basic to any democratic constitution that are likely 
to provide citizens with incentives of exactly the wrong kind—incentives that lead them to 
be selfish and lazy rather than public-spirited and active.” Christopher L. Eisgruber, Civic 
Virtue and the Limits of Constitutionalism, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2137 (2001). Among 
these features are the electoral institutions often associated with large-scale democracies. 
According to some critics, elections themselves reduce citizens “to alienated spectators,” and 
voting reduces to the pursuit of self-interest or partisanship. Benjamin R. Barber, Neither 
Leaders nor Followers: Citizenship Under Strong Democracy, in A PASSION FOR 
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN ESSAYS 98 (1998). Moreover, as Eisgruber notes, some particular 
voting rules—such as the guarantee of anonymity—create an “incentive to act on the basis 
of self-interest” precisely because voters need not defend or account for their decision as an 
exercise of deliberation about the public good. Christopher L. Eisgruber, supra, at 2138. 
120 Tushnet, supra note 30, at 504. 
121 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 133–34 (regarding discussion on the Juridic Constitution). 
122 Amar has argued that the juridic reading of the Bill of Rights has exacerbated the 
incorporation doctrine. See generally CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74. 
123 In Peopling the Constitution, I argued the more nuanced view that civic illiteracy of 
the Constitution is less pronounced than commonly supposed, and equally a rational response 
on the part of citizens who have, under the Juridic Constitution, neither cause nor opportunity 
to engage constitutionally. PEOPLING, supra note 1. 
124 See Hemberger, supra note 9, at 142 (concerning Second Amendment rights); Civic 
Constitutionalism, supra note 9 (concerning the Second Amendment); see also John E. Finn, 
Peopling the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING 105–06 (Jeffery K. Tulis & 
Sanford Levinson eds., 2014).  
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the learning of civic skills and habits, gives us some guidance 
about how such provisions ought to be interpreted. We ought 
to favor interpretations of the First Amendment that facilitate 
the flourishing of a wide variety of associations and 
communities of faith. Our interpretation of First Amendment 
guarantees ought to encourage social, cultural, and religious 
pluralism by enlarging opportunities for citizens to associate 
with others in civil society. In other words, we ought to favor 
interpretations of the First Amendment that both open up civic 
space and which help to populate it.125 
 
In contrast, a juridic approach to constitutional maintenance does not 
envision much of a role for citizens in realizing the guarantees of the First 
Amendment, trusting their enforcement instead to courts (and this is typical 
of most contemporary constitutional theory which, far from trusting citizens 
to enforce civil liberties, fears or belittles their capacity to do so).126 Compare 
this with Amar’s description of how constitutional guarantees, among them 
the First Amendment, might be maintained by the people: 
 
The emphasis on popular enforcement would of course prove 
prescient. Less than a decade after the Bill of Rights became 
law, federal judges cheerfully sent men to jail for criticizing 
the government, but opponents of the Sedition Act—led by 
Jefferson and Madison—ultimately prevailed by “appeal[ing] 
to the sense of the community . . . . First, they attempted to 
“appeal” from judges to juries, who embodied this community 
sense. When blocked by judges, they used the media of state 
legislatures to transform the election of 1800 into a national 
public seminar on constitutional principles. Thus educated, 
ordinary Citizens on election day registered the “community 
sense” that the Act was a usurpation.127 
                                                 
125 PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 119. 
126 See id. at 222–24 (regarding the juridic approach to constitutional maintenance); 
James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
509, 547 (1997) (discussing the perceived inability of the people to respect rights and its 
implication for constitutional theory) (book review). 
127 CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 132. Amar also writes: 
Though their personal labors in founding the University of Virginia 
signaled the special depth of their commitment, Madison and Jefferson 
were hardly unique in seeing the centrality of public education. In 1775, 
for example, Moses Mather declared that “[t]he strength and spring of 
every free government is the virtue of the people; virtue grows on 
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Amar’s take on the Bill of Rights generally, and the First, Second, and 
Seventh amendments in particular, likewise stresses their civic educational 
aspects: 
 
The idea of popular education resurfaces over and over in the 
Bill of Rights. As we have seen, each of the three intermediate 
associations it safeguards—church, militia, and jury—was 
understood as a device for educating ordinary Citizens about 
their rights and duties. The erosion of these institutions over 
the last 200 years has created a vacuum at the center of our 
Constitution. An uneducated populace cannot be a truly 
sovereign populace.128 
 
 The Second Amendment may also be rich with civic significance. As 
Suzette Hemberger has noted: 
 
For the Antifederalists . . . much more was at stake in debates 
over the militia than the question of who would go to war. 
Militia musters, even more than elections, were the occasions 
on which white men experienced their status as republican 
citizens . . . . Thus, when the Federalists held out the 
possibility of relief from this admittedly burdensome 
obligation, the Antifederalists foresaw the destruction of a 
vital civic institution . . . .”129 
 
Other scholars, notably David C. Williams, have also explored the meaning 
of the Second Amendment in civic constitutionalist terms.130 
                                                 
knowledge, and knowledge on education.” After quoting Mather, Gordon 
Wood sums up the ethos of the era in his own words: “And education, it 
was believed, was the responsibility and agency of a republican 
government. So the circle went.” “The most obvious republican instrument 
for . . . inculcating virtue in a people was education.” We should not be 
surprised, then, that each of the first six Presidents of the United States 
urged the formation of a national university. In the didactic language of 
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 . . . . 
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 33, at 1210–11 (citations omitted). 
128 CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 133. 
129 Hemberger, supra note 9, at 141–42. 
130 See Civic Constitutionalism, supra note 9; Civic Republicanism, supra note 9, at 551–
615. 
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The civic dimensions of the constitutional text are also readily 
apparent in the provisions regarding juries, referenced in Article III, Section 
2, and in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. Like militias, juries were an 
occasion for civic engagement: “[B]oth were institutions in which ordinary 
citizens would exercise power, and both provided opportunities for local 
knowledge to be brought to bear in the implementation of national 
policies.”131 As Konig has noted of colonial era juries, “Guarantees of rights 
embedded in the text of the document, such as trial by jury, were thus 
guarantees of the public institutions and mechanisms that would protect the 
republican form of government necessary to individual freedom.”132 
 Many democratic theorists have identified juries as an important 
instrument of civic education. As Tocqueville observed, “[T]he jury, which 
is the most energetic form of popular rule, is also the most effective means of 
teaching the people how to rule.” 133  Service on local juries was a vital 
institution for civic engagement and learning for the anti-Federalists. 134 
Conceived as instruments of reason and deliberation, juries are a critically 
important device for civic education, not only because they teach, but also 
because they can have a “profoundly transformative effect” in converting 
“private individuals into public citizens, private interests into public 
judgments.”135 “Simply put, deliberation promises to change how people act 
as citizens.”136 Juries model a pattern of civility and conversation for the body 
politic more broadly. Moreover, because service on a jury involves a 
considerable expenditure of time and resources, in sharp contrast to ritualistic 
                                                 
131 Hemberger, supra note 9, at 145. 
132 Konig, supra note 20, at 1321. 
133 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2004). 
134 See Hemberger, supra note 9, at 144–47 (regarding discussion of the civic importance 
of local juries—and by implication why its mention in the constitutional document of 1789 
is further evidence of the text’s civic and juridical dimensions). 
135  John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: 
Assessing the Civic Value of Institutionalized Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 605 
(2007). Gastil and Weiser conclude that jury service has a measurable impact on civic 
engagement beyond voting. Id. at 619. They find in a large-sample survey of persons 
reporting for jury service that “a rewarding jury experience was associated with increases in 
a wide range of civic and political behaviors . . . .” Id. at 614. But see Lynn M. Sanders, 
Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997). 
136 Gastil & Weiser, supra note 135, at 606. 
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exercises of citizenship like voting and saluting, jury service affords citizens 
an opportunity to practice the civic virtues.137 
 5. In Addition to, and Amendment of. As a last matter, we may 
wonder why the Preamble to the Bill of Rights concludes by proposing 
articles that are both “in addition to, and Amendment of” the Constitution. 
To my knowledge, no one has ever proposed that there is any significance to 
this particular language. 
 I suppose the phrasing may simply be a rhetorical redundancy: 
amendments are necessarily additions to the constitutional script, not only in 
a literal sense, but also because they typically make provision for some 
concern that was overlooked or attended to insufficiently in the original text. 
On this line of thought, every constitutional amendment is necessarily an 
addition to the text. (On the other hand, some amendments simultaneously 
add to the text, in the literal sense, and subtract from it as well—repealing 
amendments, such as the Twenty-First, come to mind.) But is every addition 
to the text necessarily an amendment?138 Is it possible to add to the text 
without amending it? The question is made both easier and more complicated 
if we accept that it is possible to amend the Constitution outside the confines 
of Article V. This opens up the possibility that some amendments, although 
additions to the Constitution writ large, are not formal additions to the 
constitutional document.139 
 One way to get at the distinction between amendments and additions 
is to ask an obvious follow-up question: which of the proposed amendments 
referred to the states in the Bill of Rights would qualify as “additions” to the 
constitutional text, and which would qualify (instead) as “amendments” to 
the text? One possibility is that additions have the character of additions when 
                                                 
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., JACOBSOHN, supra note 18; see also MURPHY, supra note 19, at 504; Walter 
F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, 
in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 179 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). Another version of this question would 
expand “the Constitution” to include more than just the constitutional document, thus 
opening up questions about the relationship of the text to nontextual parts of the 
constitutional order writ large, as well as questions about amending either the text or the 
larger order through practice, interpretation, custom, and related “amendments” that might 
occur outside the ambit of Article V. There is a voluminous literature on this question. See 
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000); Consent of the 
Governed, supra note 87. 
139 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 138; Consent of the Governed, supra note 87. 
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they are essentially declaratory in nature, but are amendments when they do 
more than make declarations. In other words, additions to the constitutional 
text advance the self-announced declaratory purpose of the Bill of Rights as 
a whole by declaring principles and rules that are implicit elsewhere in the 
text, whereas amendments do more than declare—they effect some 
significant change to extant meaning (thus recalling Amar’s definition of 
declaratory discussed above). 140  Following Hamilton’s argument in 
Federalist 84 about how the entire Constitution should be read as a Bill of 
Rights, thus making a laundry list of rights unnecessary, if not dangerous, we 
might then argue that the first eight Amendments are not amendments 
effecting a substantial change in meaning, but instead represent additions to 
the text—additions that are perfectly consonant with its extant meaning.141 
 As above, an obvious objection is that the function of declaration need 
not necessarily be hitched to a priori assumptions about what substantive 
point is declared. The amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights might 
“declare” things about the overall meaning and substance of the constitutional 
order that go well beyond making explicit what is fairly implicit. They might, 
instead, declare principles that contravene or contradict or unsettle 
understandings that were widely agreed and assumed to mean something else. 
They may declare principles, in other words, that contest rather than reaffirm 
meaning.142 To be more specific, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights might 
                                                 
140  See CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION supra note 74, at 28 (1998); Cleveland 
Marshall Lecture, supra note 111, at 574; see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 
33, at 1154. 
141 HAMILTON, supra note 79. 
142 This suggests a question: Does “amend” necessarily mean to “correct” or to “fix” a 
prior version of the constitutional text in some way, or should it also include significant and 
substantive alterations of the body politic? Put another way, is there a point at which 
amendments to a text are so far-reaching that they amount to more than just amendments? Is 
there a meaningful difference between additions to the constitution, amendments of the 
constitution, and revisions of the constitution? The California Supreme Court took up some 
of these questions in the fascinating case of Raven v. Deukemejian, where it struck an 
amendment to the state constitution, the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act,” because it was 
a revision of the constitution and not an amendment to it. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). The 
Court concluded that the proposal would have fundamentally changed and subordinated the 
constitutional role assumed by the judiciary in the governmental process. Id. at 1089. 
Following this logic, articles that purport “to amend” the text, in contrast to “revisions,” do 
not effectuate some significant or substantive change in the meaning of the Constitution. But 
there are other ways to apprehend what it means to amend. One alternative sees the 
amendment process as a way of effecting or institutionalizing revolutions. This 
understanding captures Paul Kahn’s description of amendment as “simply a point of contest 
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declare an understanding of the constitutional order that disputes the vision 
implicit in the Great Preamble. This again underscores the possibility that the 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights and the Bill of Rights are sites of contested 
constitutional meaning, of contests about the nature and identity of the 
constitutional order itself. Indeed, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights might be 
seen as a re-constitution of sorts of the constitutional order, this time 
emphasizing elements of a constitutional identity that its proponents may 
have plausibly thought were undermined or undervalued by the original 
constitutional order (and the Great Preamble). 
 I do not want to assign too much significance or weight to these 
distinctions, if only because they seem artificial, if not esoteric, even to 
lawyers. We typically use the language of “amend” to encompass the 
concepts of change, alteration, and addition and subtraction pretty much 
interchangeably. 143  And also because the Preamble to the Bill of Rights 
indicates that all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights were proposed as 
“amendments” of the text. But I do think it is worthwhile to ask why the 
authors of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights chose to use the language of 
addition and amendment and to ask if the phrasing and distinction served a 
purpose. 
 At the risk of reading too much into it, I think the phrase “in addition 
to” does serve a distinct civic purpose. As Breslin notes, most constitutional 
amendments in the United States “have been . . . individual and often isolated 
attempts to manage specific political, legal, and cultural problems. We need 
look no further than the amendments ratified in the twentieth century to 
illustrate the point.”144 Unlike the later amendments, which typically we read 
as individual, stand-alone modifications of the text (the Reconstruction 
Amendments are an obvious exception), the Bill of Rights is a complete text 
on its own—or at least, that is how we should read it.145 So, the language of 
                                                 
between competing understandings of the political order.” PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF 
LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 63 (2002). 
143 MURPHY, supra note 19, at 498 n.4 (discussing Gordon Wood’s treatment of the 
amending clause, arguing that Wood “conflates three concepts . . . (1) amendment . . . (2) 
revision . . . and (3) revolution . . .”). 
144 BRESLIN, supra note 2, at 105. 
145 Amar has made this argument repeatedly:  
To many Americans, the Bill of Rights stands as the centerpiece of our 
constitutional order--and yet constitutional scholars lack an adequate 
account of it. Instead of being studied holistically, the Bill has been 
chopped up into discrete chunks of text, with each bit examined in 
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“additions to” is meaningful because it signals that the Bill of Rights is meant 
to be read as a whole and as having an instructional purpose and not simply 
as list of individual “corrections” of the original text.146 In this way, the 
language of “in addition to” reveals a larger coherence and unity to the Bill 




Civic constitutionalist readings of the Constitution embrace a 
particular understanding about what the constitutional enterprise means, 
about what it entails, and about how to maintain it over time. In counseling a 
civic constitutionalist reading of the Bill of Rights, the Preamble to the Bill 
of Rights conceptualizes the constitutional project as an effort to achieve a 
constitutional way of life. It reads the Bill of Rights as an ambitious program 
of civic education in which the constitutional document is itself a text of civil 
instruction. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights is thus further and important 
evidence of the Constitution’s civic character, of its efforts to create a 
constitutionally informed body politic and to install a kind of civic 
constitutionalism, in which citizens bear a significant responsibility for 
maintaining the constitutional enterprise. 
                                                 
isolation. In a typical law school curriculum, for example, the First, Ninth, 
and Tenth Amendments are integrated into an introductory survey course 
on “Constitutional Law”; the Sixth, Eighth, and much of the Fifth are 
taught in “Criminal Procedure”; the Seventh is covered in “Civil 
Procedure”; the takings clause is featured in “Property”; the Fourth 
becomes a course unto itself, or is perhaps folded into “Criminal 
Procedure” or “Evidence” (because of the judicially-created exclusionary 
rule); and the Second and Third are ignored. 
Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1131; see also Neuborne, supra note 62.  
146 Currie, supra note 10, at 856. Amar agrees, “There is no evidence that this change 
was anything but aesthetic.” CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 143. Amar 
agrees that the change was more than simply aesthetic, however, noting that “[n]evertheless, 
the change had the unhappy effect of blurring the implicit rule of construction at work,” i.e., 
of limiting the application of the Bill of Rights to the federal government. Id. at 153. 
